報告題目：Optimal mediated equity auction design

報告人🤹🏿：中山大學  王大中研究員

時間💬：2018.11.09    13:30

地點🧑‍🔬：旭日樓306教室

報告內容簡介💆🏿‍♀️：This paper considers equity trading mechanism design for a profit-making intermediary that mediates a seller's asset sale. We first investigate a benchmark model: optimal mediated cash trading mechanism in terms of intermediary’s profit-maximizing objective. And then we fully characterize the intermediary-optimal equity trading mechanisms. In optimal equity trading mechanisms, the seller's asset is allocated to the buyer with the highest value if his virtual value is greater than the seller's virtual value. Moreover, we compare optimal equity trading mechanisms and optimal cash mechanisms, and find that the former outperforms the later in terms of allocation efficiency and the intermediary's expected profit. Lastly, we construct a two-stage equity mediated auction with commission fee to implement the optimal equity trading mechanism. In the optimal mediated equity auction, the intermediary subsidizes the seller to withhold the asset ex post.

報告人簡介📤：王大中，經濟學博士♚，中山大學沐鸣2注册專職研究員，研究領域包括博弈論和市場設計。Journal of Mathematical Economics, Mathematical Social Sciences, 《經濟研究》、《財經研究》等國內外重要學術期刊發表論文10余篇。